Newspoll – Bad news for the Coalition

Yesterday, Larvatus Prodoe reported Newspoll figures suggesting that 63% of urban Coalition voters want the Federal Government’s ETS passed. This result means that the Liberals might lose some 20 metropolitan seats at the next election if they continue to delay and block the legislation.

It also suggests that the Greens could pick up a seat or two in the Senate. More first preferences for the House could also go to the Greens, but it is unlikely that they will pick up a House of Representatives seat in Queensland due to the dominance of the two major parties.  

If the Coalition does block the ETS, and renege on its agreement, it’s not just the 2010 election – double dissolution or not – that they are out of the race for. It might the subsequent one to two elections as well.

Switching from Turnbull to a climate change denialist is likely to spell disaster for the Coalition.

Update: The Queensland LNP is currently debating the ETS.

Why we need greater accountability measures for ministerial staff

The revelation that a ministerial staffer pressured public servants into recommending a particular course of action (in the current case before Queensland’s Crime and Misconduct Commission a sports grant), without the knowledge of the minister, sound eerily familiar.

For some time, others and I (e.g., Kimber, 2000, 2004, 2006; Kimber & Maddox, 2003; Ehrich, Cranston & Kimber, 2004) have argued that the realities of an expanding system of ministerial staff mean that the question of their accountability must be addressed. Public servants have been reporting the potential of ministerial staff trying to direct them.

Why is this bad if the role of a ministerial staffer is to provide their minister with political advice? It is bad because the role of public servant is to provide their minister with expert advice in a frank and fearless manner (yes, I know this phrase is cliché but it is true). Thus they must at times provide the minister with advice that the minister might not want to hear. They are afforded tenure and anonymity to ensure that they can provide advice without fear or favour (yes, I know another cliché). It is bad because the power balance must favour the minister because the minister is the elected representative.

Public servants are now covered by a range of ethical requirements including codes of conduct, post-separation employment conditions, and whistleblower protection. In many cases ministerial staff are not covered by similar provisions.

While the Merri Rose affair indicates that ministerial staff should be afforded some protections (e.g., Tiernan), these protections should not condone their usurping both the role of the public servant and the role of the minister. It is when ministerial staff pressure public servants and act without the knowledge of their minister that governments must act to reduce the power of ministerial staff. They must increase the accountability of ministerial staff. They must increase the power of public servants so that they can interact with ministerial staff on a level playing field.

In previous research I have offered the following as means of enhancing the accountability systems covering ministerial staff.

- Code of conduct similar to that for public servants, but contains recognition of the distinct political role of ministerial staff.

- Ensure that the behaviour of ministerial staff as well as ministers and parliamentary secretaries is fully covered by the Integrity Commission.

- Ensure that ministerial staff can be called before parliamentary inquiries

- Develop positive relationships between staff and the department – the minister and the head of department

- Ministers, senior ministerial staff, and department heads model ethical behaviour

- Department heads ensure that ministerial staff understand the role of public servants

- Department heads ensure that public servants understand the role of ministerial staff

- Ensure that ministerial staff as well as public sector employees are covered by whistleblower protection legislation.

To these I would add that post-separation provisions could be enacted and a limit on the numbers and roles of ministerial staff be considered. We need to accept that twenty-first century ministers will obtain political advice from staff, but we cannot accept that this role extends to directing public servants and acting without the knowledge of ministers, as these actions are far from consistent with the principles of responsible parliamentary government.

Accountability and integrity reforms in Queensland

The Queensland Premier’s moves to cap political donations, cap election spending and move towards the public funding of elections, enhance the powers of the Integrity Commission, and ban success fees for lobbyists are to be applauded.

Yet this donations cap, and it must be remembered that donations are not purely monetary, cannot be something that is purely imported from another jurisdiction. It needs to be adapted to the specifics of Queensland and a federal system, where political parties operate at federal, state and local levels. Policies that are not adapted to the specific context in which they are being implemented sometimes have a habit of failing.

These expanded powers for the Integrity Commission need to be backed by financial and staffing resources, and by ongoing modelling of ethical behaviour.

Some reforms to Parliament are also needed, such as voting method or set seats for minority groups similar to the seats for Maoris in New Zealand parliament. Reinstituting an upper house is likely to expand the number of politicians. The party system is too entrenched for a reinstated upper house to act as a house of review.

It is now incumbent on the federal government, and other state and territory governments to follow suit. The perception of corruption is sometimes higher in those systems of government that have extensive integrity system such as that which exists Queensland. This perception is because those who work in these systems are better at identifying it, exposing it, and hopefully eradicating it. It is those governments in which these integrity systems do not exist that concern ought to be directed at.